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DeJarmon: Religion, Adoptions and the Conflict of Laws

RELIGION, ADOPTIONS AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
LEMARQUIS DEJARMON*

In recent years the device of adoption has become a very popular
method of providing for the care and welfare of many unfortunate
children who would otherwise become a charge upon the State. Not only
has this been the case in the United States, but also it has been the case
inmost of the countries of the world.1 The anxiety and uncertainty in
human affairs, one of the results of the long continuance of the Cold War,
have produced some serious socio-economic as well as political problems
Sporadic and spasmodic tampering with the
regarding child care.
welfare laws of the various states is, to say the least, an ineffective
approach to a solution of these problems.
In the United States, the need for a more definitive program of adoption is greater today than in any other comparable period in American
history. Practically every public or private child care agency has a
backlog of eligible children for adoption. Reports show that approximately 208,700 women were delivered of out of wedlock babies in the
United States in 1958.2 Periodically the mass communication media carry
reports and documentaries on the increase of the Black Market Babies
racket. More recent reports show that more and more illegitimate children are being born to those who, because of their age limitation, have
very low income earning power. Fern N. Eckman' reports that of the
number of mothers who were delivered of out of wedlock babies in 1958,
more than 83,000 were under twenty years of age, and 4,000 of that
number were under fifteen years of age. Obviously, these mothers, because of limited training and tender years, were ill equipped to provide
these children with the foundation for a successful life.
An effective adoption program would provide a large number of these
children with the best probability of a creative and useful life for them* A.B., 1939, Howard University; J.D., 1948, Western Reserve University;
LL.M., 1962, New York University; Professor of Law, North Carolina College Law
School.
'McVeety, Comparative Study of the Law of Adoption of Minors, 47 WOMEN
LAW. J. 13 (Spring, 1961).
Eckman, The Unwed Mothers, New York Post (June 18, 1961). [Magazine]
3

Ibid.
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selves and for their communities. For this reason, among others, it may
be worthwhile to take a new and closer look at our adoption laws. One
of the unique contributions of American jurisprudence to the law of
adoption has been the principle that the adoption should serve the best
interest of the child to promote the welfare of the child. This contribution has been the source of some of our more serious conflict of laws
problems. During the late nineteen forties and early nineteen fifties,
a large number of states had added a religious identity requirement as an
integral part of the "welfare of the child" or "best interest of the child"
test.4 This requirement usually provides that the courts of the particular
state will not decree an adoption unless the adoptive parents are of the
same religious faith or persuasion as the natural parent, usually the
mother, or that of the child where the child is old enough to choose. If
the child is too young to choose a religion of his own, then the religion
of the natural parent is imputed to him.
The state policies as represented by these enactments have hardened
down into four basic patterns, namely:
(a) Some states have attributed controlling weight to the religious
differences of the natural parent and the adoptive parents and
have rejected the would-be adoptive -parentsolely on these grounds.
(b) Some states have taken the position that if other considerations
show that the best interest of the child would be served, then the
adoption would be approved on the condition that the adoptive
parents rear the child in the religion of the natural parent. 5
(c) Still other states 'have taken the position that the potential adopting
parents should be selected or rejected on consideration of their
religious affiliation along with factors, such as home environment.
(d) Finally, still other states have taken the position that the religious
differences between natural parents and the adoptive parents should
be subordinated and not given any considerable weight in approving
the adoption.
The main stem which supports all these patterns is the right of the natural
parents to determine the religion of the child who is to be adopted by a
stranger. This religious factor is deemed an integral and necessary ingredient of the child's welfare.
On at least two different occasions,' State Court Justices have sug'For a comprehensive review of the legislation in the various states, see Appendix, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianshipand Custody, 54 COL. LAW
REV. 376 (1954).
5Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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gested that the trial court take notice that there were persons of the same
religious faith who could have adopted, even though there was no evidence
that these persons were attempting to adopt the particular child.'
At an early date, the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Administration8 reported that about 60 per cent of all adoptions were of illegitimate children. Further, a survey of nine states revealed that in a given
year, of 1,508 children who were adopted, only 318 were adopted by
members of a given religion, although the religion represented nearly
one-half of the population of the nine states surveyed. The question
may well be asked, whether, when there is a possible shortage of adoptive
parents of the same religious faith as the natural parents, the best interest of the child is promoted by a prolonged stay in a welfare institution until adoptive parents of the same faith are found?
If we consider the four basic patterns of state policy on the religious
identity test, in the light of the serious problems of illegitimate children
cited earlier, it is apparent that conflict of laws problems are latent in this
area. If we consider the four basic patterns in the light of our experiences in the way the courts have applied the religious identity factor, the
conflict of laws problems become more apparent. What societal interest
is fostered by a policy which is structured to encourage forum shopping
on the part of those desiring to adopt children? Transactions involving
foreign contacts invariably raise questions of jurisdiction, choice of law
and extra-state recognition.
Jurisdiction
Any discussion of the issue of jurisdiction to decree an adoption
necessarily raises the question of the domicile of the parties. The
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws9
takes the position that jurisdiction to decree an adoption is based on either
of two factors: the domicile of the adoptive parents or the domicile of the
child. Jurisdiction based on the domicile of the adoptive parents is usually
conditioned on the court also having jurisdiction over the person having
legal custody of the child. Adoptions have two opposing results which are
(a) the destruction of the parent-child relation between the child and his
"Tomkins & Jencken, Modern Roman Law, pp. 113, 131, 132 (1870) ; Cooper,
The Institutes'of Justinian, 3rd ed.; John Voorhis, N.Y. 1852, Book I. Shuman,

Roman Law in Modern World, Vol. II, p. 84, 1922.
Religious Factors in Adoption, 28 INn. L.J. 401, p. 407 n.35 (1953).

Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 142 (1958); also Taintor, Adoption in
the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. PiTT. L. REv. 222 (1954).
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natural parents on the one hand; and (b) the creation of the parent-child
relation between the child and the adoptive parents on the other hand.
Since adoptions have this dual effect, a number of jurisdictions outside
the United States base jurisdiction to decree adoption on the domicile of
the natural parent or on the domicile of the child. In this way it is felt
that both interest and status are represented before the court. If the adoption is decreed at the domicile of the natural parent or at the domicile of
the child, where it is different from that of the natural parent, the existing
parent-child status is necessarily before the court. The presence of the
adopting parents would be sufficient to satisfy the interest of all in either
the existing status or in the status to be created.
Under the prevailing American view, the interest of all concerned
with the adoption may not be fully satisfied. In the majority of cases,
the domicile of the adoptive parents is the place with the least contacts
with the religious faith of the natural parent which, policy-wise, is an
important ingredient of the best interest of the child. This becomes unmistakably clear in the instances where the adoptive parents have acquired
a new domicile of choice for the purpose of avoiding the religious policy
of their original domicile. The case of Ellis v. McCoy ° is a prime example. The Ellises, after having been denied an adoption decree in
Massachusetts because of religious differences, fled Massachusetts, taking
the child with them. After acquiring a domicile in Florida, where the
religious factor has been subordinated, they applied for and received a
decree of adoption." The child involved in this adoption was present in
the adopting state only because of the adoptive parents' desire to evade
the religious requirement of the domicile of the child and the child's
natural parent. In this respect, Florida had the least contact with the
natural parent-child status it purported to destroy, or with the religious
factor which according to Massachusetts should survive the destruction
of the parent-child status. The writer is of the opinion that in this
case, Florida, since it was neither the domicile of the child nor of the
natural parent, did not have the natural-parent-child before it, and thus,
under Pennoyer v. Neff2 should have been powerless to affect the status.
Ellis v. McCoy, 3 in its final disposition, creates a situation reminiscent
"0Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955); Appeal dismissed
sub nom, Ellis v. Doherty, 334 Mass. 456, 136 N.E.2d 203 (1956).
" In Re Adoption of Hildy McCoy, Chancery No. 199852, N. Fla. (July 10,

1957).

'"95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
18

Note 10, supra.
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of that created by the decrees in the so-called migratory divorce cases.
For this reason it is suggested that jurisdiction to decree an adoption
should be based on the domicile of the natural parents or on the domicile
of the child, when his domicile is different from that of the natural parent.
The natural parent's or the child's domicile is usually the place with the
most contacts with the factors which comprise the best interest of the
child test.
It has been advanced that it is the advantages of the new adoptive
status that should be accentuated and made controlling. Therefore, if
the court has jurisdiction over the person who has legal custody of the
child or if the child is a waif, subject to the jurisdiction of the state, there
is sufficient contact to empower the state to decree an adoption. In the
Matter of Maxwell, 5 the mother migrated to Buffalo, New York, to
avoid the Canadian authorities. The baby was born in Buffalo and given
up for adoption there. The New York court, treating the child's domicile
as different from that of the mother and since New York was the domicile of the adopting parents, took jurisdiction of the case. The New York
court, emphasizing the welfare of the child, recognized that the religious
choice of the mother should survive and continue into the new adoptive
status which the court was empowered to create. In considering that
the child in this case, having been born in Buffalo and having been given
up for adoption in Buffalo, had acquired a domicile in fact in Buffalo,
which was different from that of the natural mother, it is obvious that the
New York court had the power to adjudicate this question. Unlike Ellis
v. McCoy,"' both the natural parent-child status and the adoptive parentchild status were before the court. Thus the court had the power to
satisfy the interest of all concerned in the adoption. Even though jurisdiction is readily admitted in this case, the religious factor raised an interesting question. Since the religious identity test is an incident of the
natural parent-child status, is the requirement a substantive part of the
proceedings? A true appreciation of the ramification for this question
can have significant effect. If the question is answered in the affirmative,
then choice-of-law rules would eliminate some of the conflict-of-law problems experienced by past decisions. On the other hand, if the question
is answered in the negative, then choice-of-law rules would increase the
1 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
343, 68 S. Ct. 1087 (1948), Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094 (1948).
154 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 843 (1958).
Note 10, supra.
'e
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probability of conflict-of-law problems. At present the courts have not
been too clear as to their position on this issue. The courts, in the few
multi-state cases, have used language which would lead one to believe
that the religious requirement is a substantive part of the proceeding.
However, on closer observation, it is discovered that these courts unhesitantly have applied their own law of religious identity as if the
requirement was not a substantive part of the proceeding.
Choice of Law
In the states where the issue has been raised, it appears that the courts
have considered the religious factor not only as a jurisdictional fact,
but also have considered it as a substantive part of the action. The
Massachusetts court in Krakow v. Department of Public Welfare,'
refused to decree an adoption, even though it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and of the parties because it could not acquire information
on the religious faith of the family seeking the adoption. In so doing,
the court cited, as authority, cases a" involving actions ultra vires the
corporation. The New York Domestic Relations Court Act"9 contains a
provision which permits the court to vacate a commitment upon the
showing of an erroneous adjudication of the child's religion.
In Matter of Santos,2" the New York court, in a per curiam opinion,
stated that the legislative mandate on religious identity left it no discretion.
In the course of the opinion denying the adoption, the court said:
It was possible to give these infants to an institution under the control of persons of their religious faith in fulfillment of the statute that
the religious faith shall be preserved and protected by the court. To
this the children had a natural and legal right of which they can not
be deprived by their temporary exposure to another religion prior to
the age of reason. (Italics added.)
These three illustrations certainly point to the conclusion that the
religious identity factor is considered to be a substantive part of the
adoption action. Since it is an incident of the status in which the domicile
of the natural parent and the child is vitally interested, the law of that
domicile should be the law that controls. The consistent application of
" 326 Mass. 452, 95 N.E.2d 184 (1950).
Springfield v. Mayo, 265 Mass. 41, 163 N.E. 653 (1928); City of Cambridge
v. Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 358, 28 N.E.2d 447 (1940). Also, Duffery v. School
Committees, 236 Mass. 5, 127 N.E. 540 (1920).
" N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act, Sec. 86(3).
20278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1951); appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y.
483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952).
18
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this principle would accomplish a greater degree of uniformity in results
in the law of adoption than is probable under the existing view. If the
Florida court in the adoption proceeding of Hildy McCoy 2 had accepted
this view, then the Florida court, aside from the jurisdiction problem,
would not have applied its own law on the religious issue but would have
applied the law of Massachusetts which was the domicile of the natural
parent as well as that of the child. In such event, the "natural and legal
right" of the child would have been protected whether the action was
brought in Massachusetts or in Florida. In this instance, the Florida
court would sit and judge as a Massachusetts court would sit and judge on
a petition for adoption of one of its domiciliaries by a non-domiciliary2 2
of a different religious persuasion. The Krakow2 3 case, in which a Brooklyn couple sought to adopt a Massachusetts child, indicates that Massachusetts would have denied the petition. Therefore, Florida would have
done the same. The results of the petition, under this rule, would not
depend so heavily on the adopting parents' choice of forum. Of more
importance is the fact that such application of the substantive rule would
avoid the situation where the status created would be recognized as valid
in one state and considered invalid in the other state.
In Matter of Maxwell,24 the New York court had a 3-1-3 split on the
religious question in an adoption proceeding of a child whose natural
mother at first proclaimed that she did not embrace any religious faith.
Later, it was discovered that, in fact, she did embrace a particular religious faith. The mother was domiciled in Quebec, but the child had been
born and given up for adoption in Buffalo, New York. The New York
court, which considers religious identity such a substantive feature that
25
the requirement has been written into the Constitution of the State,
did not take one look at the laws of Quebec, the domicile of the natural
mother and, at least by operation of law, the domicile of the child.26 The
writer has not been apprised of any religious test in Quebec; but since
21
22

Note 11, supra.
Briggs, Excerpts from Utility for Solving the "Renvoi," in Selected Read-

ings on Conflict of Laws, 189 A. Am. L. S. (1).
2 Note 17, supra.
24 Note 15, supra.
22

Art. VI, Sec. 18, N.Y. Constitution. This provision is reported to be the only
State constitutional provision of its kind. Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of

Children, 35 B.U.L.
26

REV.

334, 372, Note 207 (1955).

Quebec requires the domicile of the applicant and of the child; Quebec R.S.Q.

1941 c. 324, Sec. 5, also, Infants Act, c. 306, R.S.S. (1953). Neither of these acts
provides that religious identity between the applicant and the child is mandatory as
a condition precedent to adoption.
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Quebec requires both the domicile of the applicant and the child before
decreeing an adoption, it is very likely that the Quebec court might consider religious identity as a part of the over-all welfare of the child.
However, I have found no indication that Quebec would consider the
identity of religions as absolutely mandatory. Thus, by applying the
Quebec law it is possible that this adoption could have been affirmed by
the New York court. In Quebec the natural mother may have been able
to consent to the cross-religious adoption. Instead, New York applied
its own law under which neither the consent of the mother nor the
existence of persons of the same faith would permit the court to decree
the cross-religious adoption.

2

A factor which carried such importance in a proceeding of this kind
certainly should be controlled by the law of the state which has the most
interest in the transaction, that is, the domicile of the natural mother or
the domicile of the child.
The possibility of uncertainty in adoptions as a result of the interplay
of the four basic patterns of state policy as set out above point toward
the desirability of a rule which would reconcile the policies of the various
states rather than a rule which would put such policies in competition with
each other. It is submitted that a rule which would require that the
religious factor be governed by the law of the domicile of the natural parent
would reduce the possibility of competition between conflicting state
policies and remove the temptation of migratory adoptions. Under such
a rule, once it is brought to the attention of the court that the petition for
adoption contains a foreign element, such as, the non-domicile of the
natural parent or the child, the forum court should look then to the law
of the other state which has an interest in the matter, and apply that state's
law to the religious issue. Not only would this procedure effect uniformity
of results, but it would also foster the universal principle that the natural
parent has the right to determine the religious faith of his child. In this
respect, the interest of both states would be reconciled in a situation where
otherwise they might be in conflict.
" See Matter of Santos, Note 20, supra. See also, Petition of Goldman, 331

Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954); cert. denied, 348, U.S. 942 (1955), where peti-

tion of adoption was denied even though the mother had consented and the adoptive parents had been found suitable on all other factors except religion. The court
found the adoption "not practicable" since it was established that many families of
the same religion as that of the child had filed applications for adoptions. However, there was nothing in the evidence to show that any of these families had ever
seen these particular children or had expressed any desire to adopt these children.
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In addition to the foregoing, the introduction of the religious requirement in adoptions provides an added reason for raising the question of
extra-state recognition. In the past, recognition of out-of-state adoptions
among the states has been primarily based on the similarity of local
policy.28 As far as can be determined, the Supreme Court of the United
States had not expressly held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Constitution requires a state to recognize an out-of-state adoption.'
However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has held at an early
date that for a state to deny the right to inherit its land to a child adopted
in another state did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 0 This
case involved the denial of one of the incidents of the adoptive status, but
not the state's denial of the adoptive status itself. A state may well recognize the adoptive status and yet deny the incidents which flow therefrom."
The question remains open as to whether a state faced with a crossreligious factor in an out-of-state adoption is free to withhold recognition of that decree on the grounds that cross-religious adoptions are contra
to that state's strong public policy. What little we have on the matter
would seem to indicate that the question should be answered in the affirmative.
When the question was raised that the Florida court should give Full
Faith and Credit to the Massachusetts decree denying the petition for
the adoption of Hildy McCoy, 2 it was argued that Massachusetts could
have considered a new application for adoption by the Ellises on a showing
of a change of religion. Therefore, since the decree was not final in
Massachusetts, it was not entitled to Full Faith and Credit in Florida.
This seems to be in accord with the prevailing view-that only final
judgments must be accorded Full Faith and Credit.'
In the United States, the "best interest of the child" is the basic test
2" See 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 292 (1958).
29 Ibid.

"oHood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1911). England has reached the same conclusion by not recognizing the adoption: In Re Wilson, 2 W.L.R. 262 (1956), a
child adopted in Montreal could not succeed to English land. To the same effect, see
In Re Wilby, 1954 Ch. 733. (Child adopted in Burma.) For other instances, see
Burnfel v. Burnfel, 2 D.L.R. 129 (1926). (Child adopted in Iowa could not succeed
to Saskatchewan land.) In Re Brophy 1947, 3 All. E.R. 172. (Child adopted in
N.Y. could not succeed to land in New Zealand.)

Erhenzweig, Conflict of Laws, Part I, Sec. 51, pp. 182, 184 (1962).
Note 10, supra.
38
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901) ; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
32
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for decreeing an adoption. The religious identity requirement has become
associated with the best interest test. It should also be noted that the
best interest test is also the test used almost universally in determining
child custody other than adoptions. In such a custody case, May v.
Anderson,3 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter advanced the thesis that the "best
interest of the child" or "the child welfare" test is a factor in which the
state has such vital interest that the state could not be precluded from
inquiry by a prior adjudication. Said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "The
child's welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon the state that
its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication
reflecting another state's discharge of its responsibility at another time."
Since the "child welfare" or "best interest" test is the same test used by
the courts in both custody and adoption cases, it is highly unlikely that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require that the test be treated
differently in adoptions from the way it has been treated in custody cases.
In this light, since the religious requirement is a part of the welfare test,
it merely adds another set of facts, the consideration of which results in
just one more element making for the non-finality of adoption decrees.
Earlier in this paper it was suggested that the religious identity factor
also raises a question of jurisdiction. It is well settled that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a court to recognize a foreign decree
when that decree has been issued by a court that did not have jurisdiction.3 5 In such a situation, the decree is subject to collateral attack in
the courts of a sister state. The cases discussed previously have certainly
treated the religious factor as a most important fact, without expressly
labelling it a jurisdictional fact. Yet a few cases have alluded to the
religious factor effect on the power of the court. Therefore, if, as these
few cases have intimated, religious identity was treated as a jurisdictional
fact in the sense that domicile is a jurisdictional fact, then a sister state
should be able to inquire into that fact in the absence of the issue having
been expressly litigated. On the court finding that the identity did not
exist, the court should be free to withhold its recognition of the foreign
decree.
Even if we consider that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require
extra-territorial recognition of the status created by the foreign decree,
4345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).
" Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Riley v. New York Trust
Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942). See also, Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoL. L. REV. 1 (1945).
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other interesting questions of out-of-state recognition may be raised. Let
us suppose that the court of State 1 has decreed an adoption, and in that
proceeding the natural mother has falsely claimed that she is of the same
religious persuasion of the adoptive parents when in fact she is of a
different persuasion. In a subsequent action in State 2, where the issue
of status is raised, equitable defenses cannot be raised in an action of
law. Should the court of State 2, with this information before it, recog0
nize the decree as long as it is outstanding in State 1 ? Jaster v. Currie"
would indicate that the decree should be recognized as long as it was outstanding in State 1, thus placing the burden on the person alleging fraud in
the procurement of jurisdiction to impeach the decree in the state of
rendition. 7 On the other hand, in a jurisdiction where law and equity
are combined, the equitable defense of fraud should be available to impeach
the decree in the second state. Then State 2, upon admitting the plea of
fraud, would withhold its recognition of the decree.8
Still further, if
religious identity is a jurisdictional fact, the court of State 2 should not
be bound by the recital of the mother in the State 1 court, should be able
to determine for itself that the particular jurisdictional fact was or was
not present, and that the State 1 court had or had not the jurisdictional
power to render such decree. 9
It is the writer's contention that the introduction of the religious factor
in adoptions merely adds an issue which makes for problems of extraterritorial recognition without serving any basic interest of the state.
The increasing number of adoptable children in most states would seem
to call for an effective program to care for these children-not a program
which makes it more difficult. The religious requirement merely complicates a beneficial device unduly and has introduced more uncertainty in an
area where uncertainty should be held to a minimum.
Conclusion
From a review of the cases in the various states which have considered
the religious requirement, two propositions are discernible:
1. By imputation, the natural parent's religious beliefs become that of
the child, and
2. Religion is to be perpetuated in the new adoptive staus, either
198 U.S. 144 (1905). See also Anno. 55 A.L.R.2d 673 (1957).
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L.Ed. 475 (1866); Maxwell v. Stewart,
89 U.S. 77 (1874).
Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N.C. 482, 55 S.E. 371, 32 L.R.A. ns (1906).
' Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945).
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(a) Restricting adoptive rights to those of the same faith of the
natural parent, or
(b) By requiring the adoptive parents to rear the new member of
their family in a religious faith different from that of their
own.

40

The latter of these two propositions is objectionable to the writer because there appears to be no societal interest served by such requirement.
The huge increase in the number of illegitimate births has resulted in an
increase in the number of children admitted to public adoption agencies.
It is difficult to see what societal interest is being fostered by requiring
a prolonged stay in a public institution simply because there are some
members of the same religious faith as the natural mother in the community. Justice Desmond, in voting to deny the adoption in Maxwell,4 '
said: "It is inconceivable that in the city of Buffalo such persons (of
same faith as the mother) could not be found." Thus Justice Desmond
would deny this child the advantages of a home life simply because some
people existed of the same faith of the mother, although the record did
not disclose that these persons were eagerly seeking to adopt this child.
Further, the suggestion that the adoptive parent be required to rear
the child in the religious faith of the natural parent, which is different
from that of the adoptive parents, is objectionable to the writer for the
following reasons:
Not only is such requirement directly contra to the historical purpose
of adoption, but the requirement serves no societal interest.
The foundation of American society is the family unit. There is
little value to society in creating a familiar status only to inject into that
status a factor so widely recognized as productive of disunity. Most
sociologists agree that a family with religious unity is the family least
likely to produce community social problems.
As has been shown earlier, there exist four basic patterns for treating
the religious requirement in this country. It seems quite possible, indeed
' See In Re Varoinkes, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.S. 355 (1936), where in a crossreligious family situation the four children involved were finally distributed as
follows: the oldest child (boy) was given to a paternal uncle and reared in the
Mohammedan faith of the father; the other three children were placed in a
Protestant home together, but one received training in the Catholic faith of the
mother, while the other two received training in Mohammedanism with the father.
See also, Froessel, J. concurring in Matter of Maxwell, 4 N.Y.S.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d
848 (1958). Further, see Paul, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant
in Adoption Proceedings, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 649 (1945).
1 Note 15, supra.
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probable, that an adoption which requires the adopting parent to rear
the child in a different religion from his own may provide additional
facts on which a sister state may disapprove the law of the adopting
state in matters involving the incidents of that adoption.
The writer is of the opinion that the "best interest of the child" test,
so uniquely an American contribution to the law of adoption and so
radically a departure from the Roman law concept of adoption, is being
defeated in its ideological purpose of protecting the homeless and destitute
child by associating it with the religious identity requirement. When the
state's policy of religious identity is placed in competition with other interests, the possible harm flowing from the religious restriction outweighs
the good of such legislation.
Since it is highly unlikely that the legislatures of the various states
will repeal these enactments, the need exists for the development of some
uniform treatment of adoptions with foreign or multi-state contacts.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has proposed a Uniform Adoption Act4 2 which has as its main thrust the
principle that adoption proceedings should be based on consent. The
theory put forward is that under this principle the adoption court is freed
of the issues to be determined in a controversy over parental rights. The
proposed act also contains a provision for recognition of out-of-state
adoptions, which would make for finality in adoption decrees.
Towards that end, the writer recommends the following:
1. That jurisdiction to decree an adoption be based on the domicile of
the natural parent or on the domicile of the child.
2. That the state legislatures enact legislation similar to that proposed
43
by the Commission on Uniform State Laws.
As for the first proposal, such requirement would bring before the
court the parent-child status as between the natural parent and the child
as well as the parent-child status to be created between the adoptive parents
and the child, which was not the case in McCoy. 44 In addition, such
requirement would minimize the problems of choice of law on some
rational basis, rather than just ignoring them, as is the case at present.
Since, under this view, both status between that of the natural parent and
child and that between the adoptive parent and child would be before the
"See 1953 Handbook, National Conference of the Commission on Uniform
State
4 Laws.
aIbid.
"Note 10, supra.
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court, the law of the forum would be the only law with complete contact
and thus capable of serving the interest of all concerned. The possible
uncertainty and complication resulting from migratory adoptions would,
for the most part, be eliminated. Further, such requirement would bring
this country more in line with the other countries of the world.
As for the second proposal, the proposed Uniform Adoption Act45
provides an effective method of interstate recognition for adoptions. The
desirable goal should be that an adoption valid where created should be
valid everywhere. The increasing economical and sociological problems
created by the increase of destitute and homeless children call for an
effective adoption program, free from uncertainty and doubt, so as to
relieve the fears of would-be adopters. Once this is done, these children
will have a better chance for a fully creative and useful life for themselves,
their community, and their country.
Adoptive parents and adoptive children should not be subjected to
the ever-present danger of having attachments which have been formed
painfully severed, "... for how may it be known that the natural mother
46
has not lied about her religious affiliations.'
41

Note 42, supra.

'"Fields,

J. Matter of Maxwell, 151 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1958).
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